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RESPONSE TO USRB'S AND KCH'S SEPARATE STATEMENTS OF FACT
Both USRB and KCH restate the stipulated facts that were provided to and formed
the parameters of, the Hearing Officer's decision. Ramsay and Smalling have no
objection to these restatements of the stipulated facts that provided the framework for his
decision.
As to the statement of facts provided by Ramsay and Smalling, KCH provides no
response. Consequently, to the extent the Record citations support the accuracy of the
additional statements of fact provided by Ramsay and Smalling, they may be considered
by this Court.
USRB responds to Ramsay and Smalling's statement of facts with clarifications to
fact numbers 10 and 18 and with a "Statement of Additional Relevant Facts" numbering
1 through 6. USRB brief, pp. 10-12. Ramsay and Smalling do not object to any of
USRB 's clarifications or additional relevant facts.
ARGUMENT
I.

FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL AND THE CONSIDERATION OF
THE FUNDING OF RAMSAY AND SMALLING'S RETIREMENT
BENEFITS, KCH SHOULD BE TREATED AS BEING SUBJECT TO THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT
In their opening brief, pp. 18-20, Ramsay and Smalling argued that it is necessary

and appropriate for this Court to address the issue sidestepped by the Hearing Officer in
the proceeding before the USRB: whether KCH's actions in establishing a defined
contribution 401 (k) plan for its employees subjected it to the requirements of fully
funding the retirement benefits required by the Act for all KCH employees. KCH's
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actions in fully funding its employees' retirement benefits for the last three years under
the requirements of the Act was certainly indicate that KCH felt it had a weak argument
to say otherwise. In their opei;iing brief, Ramsay and Smalling asked this Court to
explicitly rule in favor of USRB and Ramsay and Smalling on this underlying issue that
caused KCH to be brought before the USRB in the first place.
In response, KCH argues that, to the extent the issue needs to be addressed for the
time frame before 2006-2009 KCH has now funded, whether KCH is subject to the
requirements of the Act should first be addressed by the Hearing Officer. KCH brief, pp.
35-37. The USRB agrees in their brief, pp. 15-18. However, in its briefUSRB goes on to
argue that it is clear under the facts and law applicable to this situation that KCH was a
participating employer under the Act and that it had liability for funding the service
credits accrued by KCH employees.
Similarly, despite stating that the liability issue ofKCH under the Act should be
remanded to the Hearing Officer rather than decided by this Court, in its brief, KCH
spends a number of pages arguing that it has no liability to comply with the Act despite
the fact that it has paid retirement benefits as it owed under the Act from 2006 to 2009 for
all but six of its employees who refused to accept its offer. KCH brief, pp. 37-43.
Whether considering the liability arguments presented by USRB and Ramsay and
Smalling against KCH alone or considering them in connection with the actions of KCH
in negotiating payment of full benefits under the Act from 2006 to 2009 for the great
majority ofKCH employees, there can be little question about this issue. There is simply
no reason to remand this matter to the Hearing Officer after this Court rules in favor of
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Ramsay and Smalling on the limitation of action issue. Rather, as outlined previously by
USRB and Ramsay and Smalling in their briefs, it is appropriate for this Court to rule
directly on the liability theory presented by USRB and supported by Ramsay and
Smalling against KCH.
There may be other issues left to be considered on remand by the Hearing Officer.
But the core liability question in this case, whether the actions of KCH in offering a
40l(k) plan to its employees in 1993 triggered the requirement that KCH provide the
complete package of retirement benefits to its employees thereafter as required by the
Act, is not reasonably in dispute. This Court should dispose of that issue in favor of
USRB and Ramsay and Smalling.

II.

RAMSAY AND SMALLING ARE ENTITLED TO APPLICATION
OF THE EQUITABLE DISCOVERY RULE BECAUSE THEY DID
NOT BECOME AWARE OF FACTS THAT ALLOWED THEM TO
PURSUE THEIR CLAIM AGAINST KCH UNTIL, AT EARLIEST,

2007
The core argument this case presents is whether the applicable three year
limitation of action is tolled either because KCH's actions constituted concealment so as
to justify tolling the running of the limitation of action or because this case present
"exceptional circumstances" that make application of the three year limitation of action
"irrational or unjust." KCH brief, p. 16 (citing Russell/Packard Development Inc. v.
Carson, 2003 UT App. 316, 9if 13 and Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, 9if 23). Whether
these provisions of the "equitable discovery" rule apply to this case is the focus of the
parties arguments to this Court.
KCH asserts, wrongly, that Ramsay and Smalling have attempted to appeal but
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failed to preserve an argument about "accrual" of their right to retirement benefits. KCH
brief, pp. 32-34. KCH is confused. It is clear from Ramsay and Smalling's opening brief,
pp. 23-24, that they are not asserting the limitation of actions has not yet begun to run.
Their reference to the fact that they have not retired and that it could be argued by KCH
that their ability to even bring a claim has not accrued is not made by Ramsay and
Smalling to present another appealable issue. It is to clarify the point that both the
claimants and KCH agree Ramsay and Smalling have standing to present this issue to
both the Hearing Officer and this Court. This paragraph at pp. 23-24 in Ramsay and
Smalling' s opening brief is meant to dispose of an issue this Court may otherwise have
felt was outstanding rather than raise a new appealable issue.
KCH and USRB also assert that Ramsay and Smalling's reference to the language
in Utah's Governmental Immunity Act ("GIA"), U.C.A. § 63G-7-401(l)(b)(i), relating to
the limitation of actions for bringing a claim under the GIA is irrelevant to this case or
was waived because Ramsay and Smalling did not present or argue that specific statutory
discovery rule before the Hearing Officer. However, Ramsay and Smalling
acknowledged that they did not raise the statutory discovery rule found in the GIA in the
arguments presented to the Hearing Officer. Opening brief, p. 22-23. Ramsay and
Smalling do not seek to raise that statutory discovery rule now. There is no need to do so.
This is because, as Ramsay and Smalling argued in their opening brief, the existence of
the statutory discovery rule in the GIA simply reinforces the need for this Court to,
"evaluate whether Ramsay and Smalling knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have known of the existence of facts to justify a claim against KCH under the GIA
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and to have the results of that evaluation guide the application of the discovery rule in
this matter." Opening brief, p. 23. This is, in fact, that standard the Supreme Court and all
parties to this case have agreed is appropriate. Berneau, 2009 UT 82 at, 22.
This question, whether Ramsay and Smalling knew or, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence of facts to justify their claim
against KCH before 2007, is what the parties agree forms the relevant inquiry. Highlands
at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County, 2015 UT App 173, 142 (citing Berneau, 123).
Ramsay and Smalling accept that the inquiry of this Court in this case is limited, as
asserted by KCH at page 16-29, to the equitable discovery rule: whether KCH concealed
information that would have led to the earlier discovery of facts by Ramsay and Smalling
about their claim or whether "exceptional circumstances" exist to make the application of
the three year limitation of action irrational or unjust. Ramsay and Smalling also accept
that they must make an initial showing that they did not know and could not have
reasonably discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to bring their claim
within three years after they initially were entitled to do so. Colosimo v. Roman Catholic
Bishop, 2007 UT 25, 1 19.
KCHs argument fails for a simple reason. It repeatedly asserts that the only fact
that mattered in terms of Ramsay and Smalling having sufficient knowledge to more
promptly bring their claim was their knowledge of the establishment and existence of
their 401(k) plan at KCH. Over and over KCH repeat the argument that there was a
"single fact," "one fact," or "sole fact" on which Ramsay and Smalling's claim rests: the
existence of the 401(k) plan at KCH. KCH brief, pp. 1, 13, 16, 18, 24. Of course, Ramsay
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and Smalling did know that they were entitled to 401 (k) benefits throughout their period
of employment after 1993 when KCH implemented the 401(k) plan. But that is far
different from knowing or having a reason to know that the existence of the 401(k) plan
required KCH to provide full retirement benefits under the Act.
More than the simple knowledge that KCH had set up a 401 (k) plan for its
employees was necessary to give Ramsay and Smalling knowledge or a reason to know
that they had a cause of action against KCH. They needed to be aware of the fact that
establishment of a 401 (k) plan KCH's triggered an obligation to provide the full range of
retirement benefits before Ramsay and Smalling could bring their claims. They needed to
be aware of the fact that KCH had provided no funding to the USRB for any service
credits for any KCH employees in order to bring their claims. They needed to be aware
of the fact that USRB was required to inform USRB that KCH had set up a 40l(k) for its
employees. It is undisputed that each of these facts was unknown to Ramsay and
Smalling until, at earliest, 2007. And KCH has made no attempt to argue otherwise or
that a reasonable person in Ramsay and Smalling's position would have been aware of
this information. As such, the equitable discovery rule applies to toll Ramsay and
Smalling' s claim.
Ramsay and Smalling' s knowledge of facts must have been sufficient to alow
them to to recognize that a claim existed. Contrast the facts of Colosimo, where the
Supreme Court ruled that the equitable discovery rule did not apply, with this case. In

Colosimo the plaintiffs knew they had been sexually abused. Colosimo, 2001 UT 25, at ,
4. They knew the abuse came at the hands of a priest and teacher at their school. Yet they
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took no action to move forward their legal claims. ,I 5. The Supreme Court ruled that
knowledge of these facts was sufficient to put the plaintiffs on inquiry notice of their
potential claims. Id. at 113. The same conclusion cannot validly be made in this case.
The knowledge of the fact that they were being provided with a 40 l(k) retirement plan at
KCH did not give Ramsay and Smalling any reason to think they were entitled to the full
panoply of retirement benefits under the Act.
As outlined in their opening brief, pp. 7-8, a defined contribution retirement plan,
such as the 401(k) plan provided by KCH, is a very different animal than a defined
benefit retirement plan such as was mandated for government employers under the Act.
KCH makes no attempt to establish, either for Ramsay and Smalling or for a reasonable
employee at KCH, that knowledge of the existence ofKCH's 40l{k) benefit plan was
information that was sufficient to put a KCH employee on reasonable notice that they
were entitled to the more extensive defined benefit retirement funds under the Act. KCH
provides no persuasive analysis to establish that Ramsay or Smalling had knowledge of
facts to put them on inquiry notice because it is self-evident that, without more
information, the mere existence of the 40 l(k) plan, standing by itself as the "single fact"
KCH touts, provides no reason for Ramsay or Smalling or any other employee in their
position to know they were also entitled to be provided additional retirement benefits
under the Act.
Instead, KCHjumps from Ramsay and Smalling's undisputed knowledge of the
401 (k) plan to the unwarranted idea that this information, without more, required Ramsay
and Smalling to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the existence of their right to
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the full defined benefits provided by the Act. In fact, if the knowledge of the existence of
the 40l(k) plan alone would have put a reasonable KCH employee on notice to inquire
about whether the full range of retirement benefits had to be provided, ruling against
Ramsay and Smalling would be justified. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 920 P .2d
575, 579 (Utah App. 1996). However, the 40(k) plan, without more, put KCH employees
on inquiry notice that more retirement benefits were available under the Act. Indeed,
KCH argues it had no reason to know that the mere existence of a 40 l(k) plan for its
employees triggered any obligation to provide full benefits under the Act. IfKCH had no
reason to know the 40l(k) plan created an obligation to provide full benefits under the
Act, how can it argue with a straight face that Ramsay or Smalling knew or had a reason
to know that was true?
Ramsay and Smalling had no reason to know about the effect the 401 (k) had on
their right to receive more extensive benefits. They had no reason to investigate further.
KCH makes no plausible argument otherwise. And the absence of a credible argument on
this point by KCH goes a long way toward establishing that pointing, aggressively though
KCH might, at the "single fact" of which Ramsay and Smalling undisputedly had
knowledge is simply insufficient to prevent the application of the equitable discovery
rule.
As to the concealment element of the equitable discovery rule, KCH argues there
is no evidence that it took any affirmative action to conceal anything and that Ramsay
and Smalling have failed to provide any evidence otherwise. But KCH never denies that
it occupied a position of superior knowledge and information, both factually and legally
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as a government employer, relative to Ramsay and Smalling. KCH argues that Ramsay
and Smalling had constructive notice, KCH brief, pp. 20-21, and that whether KCH's
constructive knowledge was greater "is not relevant to the equitable tolling analysis."
KCH brief, p. 21, n. 10. But this is not accurate. The weighing of factors this Court takes
into account in evaluating whether to apply the equitable discovery rule weighs in favor
of Ramsay and Smalling.
KCH cites Helfrich v. Adams, 2013 UT App 37, to support its argument that the
disparity between the knowledge and legal duties of KCH versus Ramsay and Smalling is
not something that matters to the analysis. One reasons Helfrich is distinguishable is
because that court did not find that any fiduciary duty between the parties existed. This
case is different. While KCH disclaims any fiduciary duty, KCH brief, p. 27, it cites no
authority to support that argument. The fact sensitive inquiry identified in First Security

Bank NA. v. Banberry Development Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1332 (Utah 1990), for
evaluating whether a fiduciary relationship exists weighs in favor of Ramsay and
Smalling under the circumstances of this case.
This case involves both statutory obligations established under the Act relating to
the obligations of KCH to its employees and fiduciary obligations "implied in law"
arising out of the nature of the relationship between the parties. Id. The statutory
fiduciary relationship is established because retirement funding under the Act is in the
nature of a "trust fund" for the benefit of employees of state government entities. U.C.A.
§49-12-104. The implied in law fiduciary relationship arises out of the relative disparity
between KCH and its employees in knowledge and sophistication regarding investment
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and disposition of the retirement funds and the ability to safeguard those funds.

Highlands supports Ramsay and Smalling' s argument that the status of KCH as a
government employer creates greater equitable consideration in the employee's favor.
KCH' s efforts to disavow any fiduciary relationship to its employees with regard to their
retirement funds is half-hearted and unpersuasive.
Until 2007, at earliest, Ramsay and Smalling had no actual knowledge that they
were entitled to any retirement benefits from KCH beyond their 40l{k) benefits. It also
clear that until 2007, at earliest, neither they nor any reasonable KCH employee had
information to trigger notice to inquire further about that issue. The language of the
Supreme Court in Garza v. Burnett, 2013 UT 66,, 11-12, is appropriate: "the doctrine of
equitable tolling should not be used simply to rescue litigants who have inexcusably and
unreasonably slept on their rights, but rather to prevent the expiration of claims to
litigants who, through no fault of their own, have been unable to assert their rights within
the limitations period (emphasis in original)." As in Garza, Ramsay and Smalling should
not be punished because they were not more prophetic. "The law does not penalize
parties for prophetic inadequacy." Id. They did not have knowledge of facts that later
came to light about their right to full retirement benefits under the Act. Those facts
include the failure ofKCH to report the existence of the 40l{k) plan to USRB, the failure
ofKCH to report information allowing USRB to identify and calculate service credits for
KCH employees, and the failure of KCH to fund those service credits. This factual
information being in the hands of Ramsay and Smalling was necessary before the
limitation of actions began to run on the cause of action against KCH.
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The fact that the existence of the 40l(k) plan, without more, gave Ramsay and
Smalling no reason to investigate is an important element for this Court to consider in
carrying out equitable balancing test outlined in Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86-87
(Utah 1981) and discussed in subsequent cases such as Berneau, ,rs 21-30 and Helfrich, ,r
18. Ramsay and Smalling provided a strong analysis of why the balancing of hardships
favors application of the equitable discovery rule in their opening brief, pp. 30-32. In
response, KCH simply asserts that Ramsay and Smalling should be thanking rather than
suing KCH ("no good deed goes unpunished"). KCH brief, p. 28.
However, it is not the employees who have violated the Act, but KCH. It asks that
even if the employees have a right to compensation for three years of their employment,
that KCH not be required to be fully responsible for its statutory violation. As it is, it has
escaped almost completely unscathed, obtaining taxpayer funds for the cost of remedying
its error. While KCH asserts that there will be some hardship associated with faded
memories and loss of documents, this is unavailing in light of the fact that it has made no
effort to prove that this information is actually unavailable. In fact, it has already been
provided to USRB and was used as the basis to calculate KCH' s exposure over the entire
16 year period from 1993 to 2009 for violating the Act. As to Ramsay and Smalling,
KCH seeks to sweep the effect of its violation of the Act under the rug.

II
II
II
II
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Knowledge of the simple fact that KCH had a 40l(k) plan did not trigger actual or
constructive notice of the right Ramsay and Smalling had to full benefits under the Act.
The equitable discovery rule should be applied to allow them the full payment of benefits
under the Act from 1993 to 2009.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of April, 2016.
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Brian S. King
Attorney for Appellants

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been
delivered via email on April 8, 2016, and by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on
April 11, 2016, to the following:
Timothy C. Houpt
MarkD. Tolman
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonoough
170 S. Main St., #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Kane County Human
Resource Special Service District

David B. Hansen
Liza J. Eves
Howard, Anderson, Hansen & Eves
560 E. 200 S. #230
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Attorneys for Utah State Retirement
Systems
DATED this 8th day of April, 2016.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that the appellant's brief is provided in 13-point text and contains 8,046
words.
DATED this 8th day of April, 2016.

16

